Krispy Kreme

Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. FIN Professor XXX XXXX Month xx, xxxx archives Krispy Kreme was founded by Vernon Rudolph later on he purchased the famous secret convention of yeast-raised doughnuts in 1937 from a French chef in New Orleans. Rudolph began to sell these doughnuts wholesale to supermarkets. The learn for his doughnuts grew quickly, and by chemise a hole in the w both of the manu grind to sell instanter to customers the concept of Krispy Kreme sell stores was born. The retail concept for Krispy Kreme doughnuts allowed Rudolph to release his mill stores to 29 shops in 12 states by the late 1950s.When Rudolph died in 973 Beatrice Foods bought his fraternity and grow it to to a greater extent than 100 locations and grow the menu to admit soups and sandwiches. Beatrice tried to tame addresss by changing the appearance of the stores and use cheaper ingredients. This negatively bear upon the comp all and Beatrice change the company to a meeting of franchise o wners. This concourse of owners was led by Joseph McAleer, who was the first Krispy Kreme franchisee. The leveraged buyout was completed for $24 meg in 1982. The new group brought back the original recipe and logo.By 1989 the group was near debt free and they were beginning to expand. The company CEO, Scott Livengood, took the company existence in April of 2000. The shargon toll aft(prenominal)(prenominal) the first day was $40. 63. Holes in Doughnut invoice Practices In May of 2004 Krispy Kreme de n unrivaled to its investors that they should post moolah to be 10% degrade than predicted. It was at this time that the low-carb diet had postulaten the U. S by storm, and Krispy Kreme blamed this low-carb diet for their low wholesale and retail gross revenue.They also announced the sales of a the Montana Mills bakehouse chain of 28 bakery cafes that had been acquired in January of 2003 for $40 million in be ware. Krispy Kreme also announced that the Hot Doughnut and c offee tree Shops were falling all of a sudden of expectations and three of them were closing at a cost of $7 to $8 million. Krispy Kreme (KKD) profligate price concluded down 30% that day. Shortly later on May 25th, 2004 when the Wall track ledger published a story about how Krispy Kreme handled is accounting for franchise acquisitions.According to the hold Krispy Kreme recorded the matter to paid by the franchisee as wager income for flying wampum, except that Krispy Kreme book the purchase cost of the franchise as an intangible asset asset and did not amortize it. In the repurchase agreement of the 7 stores in Michigan, they allowed one of the franchises top executives to stay on with the company after the repurchase. This executive odd(p) the company shortly after closing the deal, and had to comport him $5 million in severance which Krispy Kreme also rolled into the unamortized-asset category. Krispy Kreme claimed it followed generally accepted accounting principl es standards and had done zero wrong.The final shoe to decline as on July 29th, 2004 when Krispy Kreme announced that the Securities and change Commission (SEC) had launched an cosy investigation related to franchise reacquisitions and the companys previously announced reduction in earning focussing. Krispy Kreme (KK) dowerys fell former(a)wise 15%. The revelations about the companies accounting dresss and showing interest as conterminous income and not amortizing the repurchased franchises exclusively rather showing them as intangible assets whole could justify the devaluation of their stock price by approx. 45%.Couple their earnings set and the announcement of store closings and it easily ass be justified. Couple that with the idolize of the unknown. If Krispy Kreme was treating their interest and reacquired franchises as they were which seems to be blatantly wrong, what else great power the SEC drive during their investigation? This fear would certainly drive i nvestors remote and their sh atomic number 18 price down. The facts along with its ratings universe dropped by 50% of analysts to gift from buy a few months earlier. Krispy Kreme Deep Fried and Possible Deeper Issues Krispy Kreme grew implausibly quickly in the twelvemonths leading up to the nvestigation (as shown in the graph infra) and then whitethorn have tried to meet Wall driveway expectations by dint of more(prenominal) or less(prenominal) indefinite practices such(prenominal) as shipping often growth or pulling ahead product orders, then allowing the orders to be returned shortly after for credit. Testimony by a spring sales director at a Krispy Kreme outlet in Ohio, verbalize a regional manager ordered that retail store customers be direct retell orders on the last Friday and Saturday of the 2004 monetary year, explaining that Krispy Kreme lossed to boost the sales for the fiscal year in order to meet Wall Street projections. The witness said the manager explained that the doughnuts would be returned for credit the following week once fiscal 2005 was under way (Chin, 2005). It seems pretty clear that Krispy Kreme was using question qualified methods to heave cabbage. Investors also later found out that Scott Livengood (CEO), the former COO toilet W. Tate, and the former CFO Randy Casstevens, unloaded more(prenominal) than 475,000 shares of Krispy Kreme stock for harvest of $19. 8 Million, (Chin, 2005) maculation they were fully conscious sales were declining since January of 2003.During this investigation, Scott Livengood, Krispy Kremes CEO announced his retirement. It would seem to me that on that point whitethorn be some deeper issues with Krispy Kreme and if I were a shareholder I would want out, or to be certain that Krispy Kremes accounting mess was cleaned up. The graph below shows Krispy Kremes performance during the historic period leading up to the investigation. Krispy Kreme Re-made crisp Today Krispy Kremes stock has not fully recovered, (see chart below), however as of the windup of 2012 Krispy Kreme seems to have made a comeback. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. Krispy Kreme) is a retail merchant and wholesaler of doughnuts completing beverages and treats and packaged sweets. The Companys principal bloodline is owning and franchising Krispy Kreme stores, at which a variety of doughnuts, including the Companys Original shiny doughnut, are exchange and distributed together with complementary products, and where a broad represent of coffees and other beverages are offered. As of January 29, 2012, there were 234 Krispy Kreme stores operated internalally in 38 states and in the regulate of Columbia, and there were 460 shops in 20 other countries more or less the world.Of the 694 score stores, 292 were factory stores and 402 were satellites. The Company operates in four segments Company Stores, domestic franchise stores, internationalist franchise stores, and the KK Supply Chain (Krispy Kreme Doughnuts). As of close of business on Friday last week KKD traded at $14. 80, way below its heyday when the stock traded in the $40s but it is double its all-time low. Krispy Kreme doughnuts (KKD as of March 22, 2013 When compared to its competitors Krispy Kremes P/E is 49. 33. This is much higher than the others but its P/S is in the middle.Krispy Kremes competitors are listed as Dunkin Brands Group, whiz Noah restaurant Group, and Starbuck Corporation. Below is the direct competitor comparison. lease Competitor similitude KKD DNKN BAGL SBUX Industry Market Cap 989. 57M 3. 94B 253. 09M 42. 99B 384. 28M Employees N/A 1,104 6,912 160,000 10. 87K Qtrly Rev yield (yoy) 0. 16 -0. 04 -0. 04 0. 11 0. 30 Revenue (ttm) 435. 84M 658. 18M 427. 01M 13. 66B 453. 84M rough-cut Margin (ttm) 0. 17 0. 79 0. 21 0. 57 0. 31 EBITDA (ttm) 47. 93M 304. 86M 48. 46M 2. 46B 47. 5M operational Margin (ttm) 0. 09 0. 38 0. 07 0. 14 0. 07 Net Income (ttm) 20. 78M 108. 18M 12. 74M 1. 43 B N/A EPS (ttm) 0. 30 0. 93 0. 74 1. 86 0. 78 P/E (ttm) 49. 33 39. 95 20. 01 30. 87 29. 99 PEG (5 yr expected) 1. 02 1. 58 0. 98 1. 43 1. 50 P/S (ttm) 2. 24 5. 96 0. 59 3. 13 1. 04 Suggestions for a Krisp/Klean Future Making Doughnuts I three things I might give notice if I were the CFO for Krispy Kreme doughnuts would be to in true sluttish communication with investors and master them that internal auditing systems are in place.Im sure that investors lost all trust in the previous management because of the questionable practices that were followed. Krispy Kreme needs to redo that trust by having open lines of communication with its investors. I would take a serious look at closing dead stores, and research other markets to open more stores. Some areas may ease be underperforming while others are booming. Concentrate on the areas that show go potential and take advantage of that market while it is supporting growth. Because their competitors seem to offer expanded menus I would concentrate on healthy choices for the dejeuner period crowd.Everyone is aware of Krispy Kremes doughnuts, but Im not so sure their other menu items are well known as an option for lunch/brunch. Other than the morning rush for doughnuts, they could organise their stores more cyberspaceable with being the go to spot for lunch also. References Chin, N. (2005). Krispy Kreme Dougnuts Empty calories or empty profits? Retrieved from http//www. corporateconflicts. com/index-sb-cases-kk. html Krispy kreme doughnuts. (n. d. ). Retrieved from http//www. google. com/finance? client=ob&q=big boardKKDKrispy KremeKrispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. FIN Professor XXX XXXX Month xx, xxxx History Krispy Kreme was founded by Vernon Rudolph after he purchased the famous secret recipe of yeast-raised doughnuts in 1937 from a French chef in New Orleans. Rudolph began to sell these doughnuts wholesale to supermarkets. The demand for his doughnuts grew quickly, and by cutting a hole in the wall of the factory to sell directly to customers the concept of Krispy Kreme retail stores was born. The retail concept for Krispy Kreme doughnuts allowed Rudolph to grow his factory stores to 29 shops in 12 states by the late 1950s.When Rudolph died in 973 Beatrice Foods bought his company and expanded it to more than 100 locations and expanded the menu to include soups and sandwiches. Beatrice tried to reduce costs by changing the appearance of the stores and using cheaper ingredients. This negatively affected the company and Beatrice change the company to a group of franchise owners. This group of owners was led by Joseph McAleer, who was the first Krispy Kreme franchisee. The leveraged buyout was completed for $24 million in 1982. The new group brought back the original recipe and logo.By 1989 the group was almost debt free and they were beginning to expand. The company CEO, Scott Livengood, took the company public in April of 2000. The share price after the first day was $40. 63. Holes in Doughnut Accounting Practices In May of 2004 Krispy Kreme announced to its investors that they should expect earnings to be 10% lower than predicted. It was at this time that the low-carb diet had taken the U. S by storm, and Krispy Kreme blamed this low-carb diet for their low wholesale and retail sales.They also announced the sales of a the Montana Mills bakery chain of 28 bakery cafes that had been acquired in January of 2003 for $40 million in stock. Krispy Kreme also announced that the Hot Doughnut and Coffee Shops were falling short of expectations and three of them were closing at a cost of $7 to $8 million. Krispy Kreme (KKD) stock price closed down 30% that day. Shortly after on May 25th, 2004 when the Wall Street diary published a story about how Krispy Kreme handled is accounting for franchise acquisitions.According to the article Krispy Kreme recorded the interest paid by the franchisee as interest income for immediate profit, except that Krispy Kreme booked the purc hase cost of the franchise as an intangible asset and did not amortize it. In the repurchase agreement of the 7 stores in Michigan, they allowed one of the franchises top executives to stay on with the company after the repurchase. This executive left the company shortly after closing the deal, and had to pay him $5 million in severance which Krispy Kreme also rolled into the unamortized-asset category. Krispy Kreme claimed it followed GAAP standards and had done nothing wrong.The final shoe to drop as on July 29th, 2004 when Krispy Kreme announced that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had launched an informal investigation related to franchise reacquisitions and the companys previously announced reduction in earning guidance. Krispy Kreme (KK) shares fell another 15%. The revelations about the companies accounting practices and showing interest as immediate income and not amortizing the repurchased franchises but rather showing them as intangible assets alone could just ify the devaluation of their stock price by approx. 45%.Couple their earnings decline and the announcement of store closings and it easily can be justified. Couple that with the fear of the unknown. If Krispy Kreme was treating their interest and reacquired franchises as they were which seems to be blatantly wrong, what else might the SEC convalesce during their investigation? This fear would certainly drive investors away and their share price down. The facts along with its ratings being dropped by 50% of analysts to Hold from buy a few months earlier. Krispy Kreme Deep Fried and Possible Deeper Issues Krispy Kreme grew incredibly quickly in the years leading up to the nvestigation (as shown in the chart below) and then may have tried to meet Wall Street expectations through some questionable practices such as shipping more product or pulling ahead product orders, then allowing the orders to be returned shortly after for credit. Testimony by a former sales manager at a Krispy Krem e outlet in Ohio, said a regional manager ordered that retail store customers be sent double orders on the last Friday and Saturday of the 2004 fiscal year, explaining that Krispy Kreme wanted to boost the sales for the fiscal year in order to meet Wall Street projections. The witness said the manager explained that the doughnuts would be returned for credit the following week once fiscal 2005 was under way (Chin, 2005). It seems pretty clear that Krispy Kreme was using questionable methods to inflate profits. Investors also later found out that Scott Livengood (CEO), the former COO John W. Tate, and the former CFO Randy Casstevens, unloaded more than 475,000 shares of Krispy Kreme stock for proceeds of $19. 8 Million, (Chin, 2005) while they were fully aware sales were declining since January of 2003.During this investigation, Scott Livengood, Krispy Kremes CEO announced his retirement. It would seem to me that there may be some deeper issues with Krispy Kreme and if I were a shar eholder I would want out, or to be certain that Krispy Kremes accounting mess was cleaned up. The chart below shows Krispy Kremes performance during the years leading up to the investigation. Krispy Kreme Re-made Fresh Today Krispy Kremes stock has not fully recovered, (see chart below), but as of the end of 2012 Krispy Kreme seems to have made a comeback. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. Krispy Kreme) is a retailer and wholesaler of doughnuts complementary beverages and treats and packaged sweets. The Companys principal business is owning and franchising Krispy Kreme stores, at which a variety of doughnuts, including the Companys Original Glazed doughnut, are sold and distributed together with complementary products, and where a broad array of coffees and other beverages are offered. As of January 29, 2012, there were 234 Krispy Kreme stores operated domestically in 38 states and in the District of Columbia, and there were 460 shops in 20 other countries around the world.Of the 694 tot al stores, 292 were factory stores and 402 were satellites. The Company operates in four segments Company Stores, domestic franchise stores, international franchise stores, and the KK Supply Chain (Krispy Kreme Doughnuts). As of close of business on Friday last week KKD traded at $14. 80, way below its heyday when the stock traded in the $40s but it is double its all-time low. Krispy Kreme doughnuts (KKD as of March 22, 2013 When compared to its competitors Krispy Kremes P/E is 49. 33. This is much higher than the others but its P/S is in the middle.Krispy Kremes competitors are listed as Dunkin Brands Group, Einstein Noah restaurant Group, and Starbuck Corporation. Below is the direct competitor comparison. Direct Competitor Comparison KKD DNKN BAGL SBUX Industry Market Cap 989. 57M 3. 94B 253. 09M 42. 99B 384. 28M Employees N/A 1,104 6,912 160,000 10. 87K Qtrly Rev Growth (yoy) 0. 16 -0. 04 -0. 04 0. 11 0. 30 Revenue (ttm) 435. 84M 658. 18M 427. 01M 13. 66B 453. 84M Gross Margi n (ttm) 0. 17 0. 79 0. 21 0. 57 0. 31 EBITDA (ttm) 47. 93M 304. 86M 48. 46M 2. 46B 47. 5M Operating Margin (ttm) 0. 09 0. 38 0. 07 0. 14 0. 07 Net Income (ttm) 20. 78M 108. 18M 12. 74M 1. 43B N/A EPS (ttm) 0. 30 0. 93 0. 74 1. 86 0. 78 P/E (ttm) 49. 33 39. 95 20. 01 30. 87 29. 99 PEG (5 yr expected) 1. 02 1. 58 0. 98 1. 43 1. 50 P/S (ttm) 2. 24 5. 96 0. 59 3. 13 1. 04 Suggestions for a Krisp/Klean Future Making Doughnuts I three things I might suggest if I were the CFO for Krispy Kreme doughnuts would be to insure open communication with investors and insure them that internal auditing systems are in place.Im sure that investors lost all trust in the previous management because of the questionable practices that were followed. Krispy Kreme needs to rebuild that trust by having open lines of communication with its investors. I would take a serious look at closing unprofitable stores, and research other markets to open more stores. Some areas may still be underperforming while ot hers are booming. Concentrate on the areas that show better potential and take advantage of that market while it is supporting growth. Because their competitors seem to offer expanded menus I would concentrate on healthy choices for the lunchtime crowd.Everyone is aware of Krispy Kremes doughnuts, but Im not so sure their other menu items are well known as an option for lunch/brunch. Other than the morning rush for doughnuts, they could make their stores more profitable with being the go to spot for lunch also. References Chin, N. (2005). Krispy Kreme Dougnuts Empty calories or empty profits? Retrieved from http//www. corporateconflicts. com/index-sb-cases-kk. html Krispy kreme doughnuts. (n. d. ). Retrieved from http//www. google. com/finance? client=ob&q=NYSEKKDKrispy KremeINTRODUCTION First, I will discuss the environment of Krispy Kreme and my analysis as to what led to the companys position in 2004. Second, I will discuss the fiscal health and current condition based upon the h istorical income statements and ratio sheets. Third, I will discuss the financial ratios in relation to the financial statements. Fourth, I will discuss if Krispy Kreme was financially healthy at the end of 2004. Fifth, I will discuss my assessment of Krispy Kremes health and why I think the stock price dropped by 80% between 2003 and 2004.Sixth, I will discuss why I think the market reacted so negatively to the disclosures about adverse results and the revelations in the Wall Street Journal regarding the firms accounting methods for the franchise rights. Lastly, I will bid my recommendations for turning around Krispy Kreme Doughnuts business. COMPANY POSITION Krispy Kreme Doughnuts started small by interchange directly to marketplace stores. Their doughnuts became so popular they began interchange directly to customers. They sold a delicious doughnut and a viewing experience.When Beatrice Foods bought the company, her business vex did not succeed because it expanded the produ ct line in the paired committal of what consumers wanted and she inputted cheap ingredients into a popular recipe which sacrificed taste. When she sold the company to the group of franchisees, it pushed the company back into a positive direction by bringing back the original recipe. Krispy Kreme was debt-free by 1989 and their IPO left them with a market capitalization of nearly $500 million in 2000.They appeared to be on the right track but, it seemed they were expanding too rapidly. They allowed franchisees to place their stores in locations that were not favorable, resulting in the franchises not doing well enough and owing Krispy Kreme Doughnuts millions. Krispy Kreme relied on the income from franchised stores purchases of equipment and mixes too much. They also had their product in too many locations, creating an extend of supply and a decrease in demand. HISTORICAL FINANCIAL pedagogy ANALYSISOn further analysis of the historical income statement, it seems that Krispy Krem e Doughnuts operating expenses are increase little by little all year and are over 75% of total revenues for to each one year. The wholly income statement item that has decreased epoch-makingly was interest income from 2002 through 2004. Everything else seemed to point towards a profitably company because both gross profit and net income were increasing by at least 2% every year. On further analysis of the historical balance sheet there we some large red flag items.Property and equipment, net of depreciation was a significant portion of total assets each year. Most of the equipment they created was sold to franchisees and use in each company owned or franchisee owned factory stores. The significant come on their balance sheet could have meant that they were manufacturing equipment quicker than they were change it to their franchises or due to the fact that they were expecting to expand, but were not able to expand to the extent they wanted to. As a percent of total assets, ac counts receivable declined from 17% in 2000 to 7 % in 2004.Inventories were significantly increasing each year, but one would assume that some of their broth would have to be written of due to the items expiration date (doughnuts can only last so long, so they appear to not be selling as much). Reacquired franchise rights, goodwill and other intangibles significantly change magnitude kickoff in 2002, and every year after that. It rose in those years to be close to one third (30%) of total assets, which was the biggest item serving wise other than property and equipment. The most significant item on the liabilities and shareholders equity section of the balance sheet is car park stock.Every year common stock was close to 50% of total liabilities and shareholders equity. In my prospect, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, recognized they were in trouble with the increasing failures of franchises and kept issuing more stock in hopes to bail themselves out. FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS In exhibit 7 the time series of the ratios raise one specific question. The inventory dollar volume raises the question as to why it was taking longer for their inventory to sell. When born-again to days, the ratio determined that their inventory took over twenty-three days to employee turnover in 2003.It seems that Krispy Kreme Doughnuts inventory was over saturated in the market. With an abundance in supply, it seems that their doughnuts were not as in demand. When comparing Krispy Kreme Doughnuts financial ratios to others in the industry, I determined that Krispy Kreme was doing better in some areas than those in the industry such as with their liquidity ratios. Krispy Kremes liquidity ratios were significantly higher than any company in its industry. In other areas, such as positiveness ratios, Krispy Kreme was about average compared to other companies.Krispy Kremes activity ratios were significantly lower than any other company in its industry, meaning their assets are not turning over as much as other companies. In such an industry, product seems to move fast, which further supports my notion that their product was graceful less popular due to the saturated market. It seems a lot more companies in this industry support operations with debt rather than capital, Krispy Kreme was doing the opposite. Exhibit nine supports this position because no other company had a significant heart of shareholders equity like Krispy Kreme.Other companies were better able to handle their operating expenses property them closer to 50% of net sales, unlike Krispy Kreme who kept theirs closer to 75%, but Krispy Kreme also had a higher percent of net sales in relation to operating profit and profit before taxes. financially HEALTHY AT YEAR END 2004? In my opinion, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts is not completely healthy at the financial year end of 2004. Their income statement shows an increased net income from the year before, but I believe that increase can only last so long.With th e inability to expand further, and current operations decreasing more than they are making, I do not expect their net income to increase by year end 2005. Everything on their balance sheet is increasing, including their inventory. They need to realize that they are simply not selling product. Although their debt is low, that is from the increasing stockholders equity in the form of stocks. With the outlook of the company not good, they cannot expect to support their operations with the issuance of new stock. They need to find a new way to finance their operations and ecrease their operating costs. beginning PRICE DECREASE AND NEGATIVE MARKET REACTION In my opinion investors recognized the same warning signs that I did when analyzing Krispy Kreme Doughnuts financial statements and decided to drop their losses while they could still make some kind of profit selling off the stock. When Krispy Kreme announced to investors to expect earnings to be 10% lower than anticipated, claiming th at the recent low-carbohydrate diet trend in the US had meet wholesale and retail sales, I think they further expected that something was not right with the picture they were portraying.The Wall Street Journal article, revealed an accounting practice that was not commonly followed by others in Krispy Kremes industry. When the SEC launched an informal investigation into the franchise reacquisitions, investors jumped ship as fast as they could. The significant decrease in stock from 2003 to 2004, was investors getting nervous and protecting themselves from their stock being worth near nothing. RECOMMENDATIONS In my opinion Krispy Kreme Doughnuts needs to make radical changes to the way it conducts business.I think they should completely stop off-premise sales, making their product only available in factory stores. This would hopefully decrease their inventory and decrease operating expenses related to the fleet of trucks that deliver product to grocery stores. Selling their product i n factory stores only will hopefully recreate the demand for the doughnuts that there once was. I also believe that they should decrease the amount of franchises and refocus to company owned stores.Franchisees might not properly know how to pick a location or be properly trained, as seen with the increase of failing franchises. This would decrease the large amount on their balance sheet from reacquiring franchises. Focusing their business to one or two types of primary sources of income and reducing expenses would be a way to dish up lower market saturation of their product. Having more company owned factory stores, provides Krispy Kreme a chance to have more control over their operations and not depend on franchisees to make a profit for them.