Habermas on Virtue :: Ethics Morals Papers

Habermas on VirtueAlthough Habermas has never worked out a conception of faultlessness and indeed criticizes this nonion whenever he uses it, his theory crucially depends on the virtuous attitude of participants in discourse be it in the realm of nation and law or that of morality. In this paper, in which I deal besides with the ethical foundations of morality, I cope first that the norms of discourse which are gained from a presuppo perplexional outline of speech as such have to be complemented by the sensitive perception on the side of the recipients. Only when the claims are dumb in their full significance for the speaker does the discourse live up to the ideal which is already anticipated in every speech act. This presuppositional analysis shows secondly that it is mainly the virtuous attitude that is morally relevant and not those capacities for acting morally that the agent already possesses. However, the virtuous attitude authentically entails the obligation to striv e to perfect all those capacities that enable us to sensitively understand the others claim. A discussion of the (discursive) capacities that have to be promoted leads to the singling out of predisposition as contrasted to immediate empathy. It is the reflexive transcendence of the agents evaluative patterns that allows this emotion to sit well with a post-conventional morality. Finally, I discuss a possible caution of Wellmer and Habermas who might claim that the proposed conception of virtuousness would still be reasonable for participants in discourse, but not for agents acting in the life-world. However, because the discursive virtue is of wide latitude, it does not fall under this objection. The last several eld have seen an impressive revival of interest in the concept of virtue. In contrast, the discourse ethics of Jrgen Habermas seems to be especially inadequate to note for the ethical significance of virtue, because by emphasizing intersubjective procedures it plays down the importance of individualist qualities. In fact, Habermas uses the term virtue rarely, and where he does use it, he criticizes it harshly for presupposing a shared conception of the good life. (1) However, as I will argue in this paper, there is a conception of deontological virtue which is not only compatible, but indispensable for Habermass theory. Thus, although he attempts to externalize virtue as a good deal as possible into procedures, discourse ethics has to presuppose that the participants possess a genuinely virtuous attitude.